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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the implications of non-human primates’ propensity to hyperbolically
discount the future. Hyperbolic discounting occurs when small, near-term rewards are preferred
over larger rewards that are realized at a future point in time, but these preferences do not hold
when the choice between long term and short term rewards is made at a time far removed from
when the choice produces rewards-- i.e., at a time when the payoff of the choice is distant. I
discuss two mutually exclusive models that attempt to explain why non-human primates
hyperbolically discount: the cognitivist and the behaviorist model. I then present evidence that
supports the cognitivist model and undermines the behaviorist model. I then argue that a “War of
Interests” (WOI) occurs within the non-human primate mind. I explain this WOI model, discuss
its philosophical implications, and then conclude with a general theory of the non-human primate
mind.
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“Thoroughly understanding the mind-monkey, the machinations in the heart, by three thousand
achievements one becomes a peer of heaven.”
-The Wuzhen Pian, a Daoist Classic

1. INTRODUCTION

The first part of my thesis will investigate the kind of mental states that non-human primates
have when making decisions.1 In studies where primates were forced to choose between
alternatives, they displayed preference reversal. For example, in a study by Freeman et al.
experimenters gave primates a choice between incompatible options: a small juice reward after a
small delay or a larger juice reward after a longer delay. The primates preferred the smaller
sooner juice reward when the payoff to the smaller sooner reward was only a few seconds away,
but preferred the larger later juice reward when the payoff to the smaller sooner reward was 60
seconds away, indicating that the primates’ preferences were temporally unstable, and
multifaceted, in that they reversed preferences.2 Further experiments by Ainslie confirm that
pigeons and humans show similar preference reversals in controlled experiments.3 The tendency
to behave in this way is called hyperbolic discounting. Hyperbolic discounting occurs when
small, near-term (smaller sooner) rewards are preferred over larger (larger later) rewards that are

1

All the primate research cited in this paper was performed on at least one of the following species: rhesus
macaques, chimpanzees, squirrel monkeys, or orangutans. All of these species fall under the classification:
“primate.”
2
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Freeman, K. B., et al. (2009).
Ainslie, G. (1982).
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realized at a future point in time; this commonly occurring preference of short term over long
term rewards does not hold when the choice between long term and short term rewards is made
at a time far removed from when the choice produces rewards-- i.e., at a time when the payoff of
the choice is distant. To use another example of hyperbolic discounting, if I ask a group of
people to choose between receiving a $100 check they can cash today and receiving a $200
check that they can’t cash for three years, most people in the group would probably choose the
$100 check today. But if I ask the same group of people to choose between a $100 check they
can’t cash for six years and a $200 check they can’t cash for nine years, most people would
choose the $200 check in nine years. But this is the same choice, seen six years in advance. The
purpose of this thesis is to figure out what this behavioral phenomenon (hyperbolic discounting)
can tell us about the cognitive architecture of the primate mind. I will then discuss two different
models that attempt to explain why primates hyperbolically discount.
I will first discuss the behaviorist model. The dialectical purpose of this discussion is to
illuminate what evidence is relevant in determining the mental states that primates have. The
Skinnerian behaviorist claims that inner mental states are not relevant in a functional analysis of
behavior. “Behavior can be explained and described without making ultimate reference to mental
events or internal psychological processes. The sources of behavior are external (in the
environment), not internal (in the mind, in the head)”.4
The behaviorist would claim that hyperbolic discounting can be explained entirely by
conditioning and reinforcement learning as follows: All observed primate hyperbolic discounting
occurs in laboratory settings. Primates need to be trained to perform the task correctly. So all the
primates are doing is choosing whatever good, albeit juice or cocaine, that has rewarded them in
the past, in previous trials. The primates need not have any intentional, content-full,
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representational mental states in order to engage in hyperbolic discounting behavior; their
behavior can all be explained by prior reinforcement.
I will then discuss the second model that attempts to explain primate hyperbolic discounting.
Contrary to the behaviorist account, the cognitivist account argues that mental states have a
causal role in producing behavior.
The cognitivist attacks behaviorist explanations of hyperbolic discounting behavior in
primates by pointing out that the primates do sometimes choose the larger later reward. This
suggests that the primate is able to delay gratification of the smaller sooner reward, which means
that his mental states must be at work to control his behavior and resist temptation. If
behaviorism is correct, the primate should always choose the smaller sooner reward because
there is no intentional, content-full, representational mental state at work to control her impulsive
choice of the smaller sooner reward.
The behaviorist may respond that the fact that primates delay gratification does not show that
they have causally efficacious mental states. In the hyperbolic discounting studies, the choice of
the larger later reward has been reinforced, just as the choice of the smaller sooner reward has
been reinforced at a different time during the experiment.
Given this analysis, hyperbolic discounting is unremarkable to the behaviorist. All it shows is
that reinforcement weakens over time. The graphs that model hyperbolic discounting may show
the role of reinforcement due to delay, but they do not suggest that mental states have any causal
role in producing behavior, the behaviorist claims.
Thus, an evidential stalemate arises between the cognitivist and the behaviorist. If the only
behavior that needs explaining is hyperbolic discounting behavior, then it is hard to adjudicate
between these two positions. Therefore, the next part of my paper will explore what evidence is
4
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needed to adjudicate this debate between the behaviorist and the cognitivist. What argument
would the cognitivist need to make, at this point, to refute the behaviorist, and what kind of
behavioral evidence would she need to make this argument?
I will argue that the evidential standard needed to adjudicate this debate would be evidence of
quickly arising, complex goal-oriented, novel behavior in primates that also has not been
reinforced in the past. I will label this the Evidential Standard Thesis.
Once I set the evidential requirement the cognitivist has to meet to refute the behaviorist, I
will argue that two pieces of empirical evidence support the cognitivist. The first is the
deployment of certain behavior tactics by primates in the hyperbolic discounting studies that
allow the primates to delay gratification. There are three general categories of tactical behaviors
that interests may use to forestall other competing interests: Desire dampening, ability inhibiting
and self-strengthening. For example, a primate may shift his attention off an immediate small
reward to avoid choosing it over a larger later reward.
I will argue, if these tactics are not rewarded during the experiments, and the primates still use
them to delay gratification, then we may say the primates’ behavior is not reinforced, and that it
counts as evidence for the cognitivist position, by the Evidential Standard Thesis.
The second piece of evidence that supports the cognitivist is evidence that primates can plan
for the future. This evidence is provided by Naqshbandi et al. who essentially demonstrated that
on the same task, primates can plan for the future, but rats cannot. Further evidence of primate
planning behavior is also provided in studies by Osvath, who showed, in his most illustrative
case, that a primate displayed novel stone throwing behavior, without being taught how to do so.
This evidence supports the cognitivist position. In order to plan for the future, a primate must be
able to mentally represent the future.

5
Once I have adjudicated the behaviorist/cognitivist debate, I will argue that the evidence
suggests that this primate propensity to discount hyperbolically supports a “War of Interests”
(WOI) model within the primate mind. I present this model as a potentially fruitful general
framework for thinking about the primate motivational system that is good for generating
questions and hypotheses. I do not present this WOI model as a finished theory of the primate
mind. According to my WOI model, we can’t regard primates as having unitary preferences,
where a preference is a desire for one interest over an alternative interest, and an interest is a
desire for a good. Rather, they have a variety of contradictory preferences that become dominant
at different points because of their timing. The desirability of an interest rises and falls,
depending on that interest’s timing. A marketplace arises, where certain interests have to behave
strategically to keep competitors from undermining them later on. For example, think of a
primate analog to Ulysses facing the sirens, in which Ulysses’s present self must act to prevent
his future self from succumbing to the siren’s song.5 These competing interests form one part of
the primate mind that I call the “intuitive system.” The duty of the intuitive system is to construct
the preferences that can be represented by the hyperbolic discount curves, and then pursue the
interest that grants the most reward. Sometimes part of the intuitive system is forestalled by
another part of the primate mind. I call this other part of the primate mind the “cognitive
system.” Larger later interests in the intuitive system use the cognitive system to forestall smaller
sooner interests. That is, the cognitive system functions as a tool that deploys the three types of
behavioral tactics described above: Desire dampening, ability inhibiting and self-strengthening
tactics. When deployed, these tactics function to subdue the smaller sooner interests and satiate
the larger later interests. The dynamics of the interaction between the intuitive and cognitive
systems determine the degree to which the primate can delay gratification, given hyperbolic
5
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discounting. In stressful environments, the intuitive system gains power and the cognitive system
weakens. In stable environments, the reverse is true.
After discussing the WOI model, I will then use it to ask some new, interesting questions and
construct some testable hypotheses. I will then discuss its philosophical implications. One theory
of the primate mind suggests that primates are completely impulsive and are reactive only to the
nearest external stimuli. Another theory suggests that primates voluntarily choose their
preferences, and their mind functions as a dictator that commands their body to attain the
preference that grants the largest reward. My account falls in between these two extreme
accounts. I contend that primates’ mental states do exert some control over their behavior, which
allows them to delay gratification and not merely react to the nearest external stimuli. But I also
contend that primates’ preferences are completely involuntary, and their ability to delay
gratification is slave to their preferences. The bottom line is that primates do exert voluntary
control over their actions, but they don’t have the ability to determine their own preferences or
interests.
In the conclusion I will address a new area of research that may be fruitful: the study of
magnitude effects in the delay of gratification studies involving primates. These studies may
support a theory that transcends my theory of the primate mind, or support a theory that
undermines my WOI model.
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2. HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING DEFINED

If animals have to choose between two similar rewards, they show a preference for the one
that arrives sooner rather than later. Animals discount the value of the later reward by a factor
that increases with the length of the delay. Traditionally, economists and psychologists assumed
that animals discount rewards at an exponential rate.
Exponential discounting means that animals discount a future reward by a fixed percentage
for each unit of time they must wait. If the discount rate is 10% per minute, an animal should--at
this moment--like equally 10 units of food now and 11 units of food a minute from now. The
same animal should also value equally 10 units 60 minutes from now and 11 units 61 minutes
from now. According to the exponential discounting model, only the length of the wait and the
animal’s discount rate, which is assumed to be constant across different wait times, determine
that animal’s preference between alternatives.
Thus, exponential discounting entails that preferences never reverse. That is, given a set of
preferences, the unfolding of time will not change the order of the preferences, no matter how
impatient an animal may be. If one option is preferred to another option at one time, then that
option will be preferred at all times.
For example, if a primate values a food item that is delivered immediately at 100 utiles and
her discount rate is 20% a minute, then the prospect of guaranteed delivery of the same food item
delivered today would have been worth 80 utiles a minute ago, 64 utiles two minutes ago, and so
on. The formula for exponential discounting is simple:
Value= “Objective Value” x (1-Discount rate)Delay
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Where Value is the present subjective value of the food, the Objective Value is the physical
amount of food item presented (10 grams, 20 grams, etc.), and the exponent is the amount of
time elapsed (in units) until the food is presented to the primate. This discount function is called
“exponential” because it calculates the value by an exponential, or power, function of the
discount rate. With exponential discounting, the difference in the utility of consuming the food
item in the above example gradually gets smaller, but it always stays positive: it never goes to zero or below zero. If the primate chose the food item when it was presented immediately, she
would choose the food item when it was a week--or a year--away.
Suppose an exponentially discounting primate is given a choice between a smaller, sooner and
larger, later reward. The figure below shows exponential discount curves from two rewards of
different sizes available at different times. The top curve represents a larger later reward and the
bottom curve represents a smaller sooner reward. The dotted vertical lines show when each
reward is available, while the x-axis is the time at which the reward might be chosen. The y-axis
is the value of the reward. Both curves have higher value from the immediate point in time, the
farther they are from it; but the curves do not cross, so the primate’s revealed preferences are
consistent over time no matter how impatient the primate might be. It is important to note that
every point on the curve represents the subjective value of the food, when it is delivered at the
point of the vertical line. So, on the graph, a unit of food would not be worth very much to me
immediately, because I have to wait for the point on the vertical line to consume that food. This
is why the values on the graph increase instead of decrease.

9

Fig. 2.1 Exponential Discounting6

For example, assume I was offered a choice of one marshmallow eight minutes from now or
two marshmallows nine minutes from now. If I were an exponential discounter with, say, a 10%
discount rate per minute, I would always prefer to wait for the two marshmallow payoff. That is,
my preference for the two marshmallows would never reverse, and I would never prefer the one
marshmallow payoff. On the graph below, the top curve represents the two marshmallow choice
and the bottom curve represents the one marshmallow choice. Each point on the curves
represents my utility of choosing that option at that given point in time. At the seven minute
mark, my utility of choosing the two marshmallow option is 1.8 marshmallows (mm’s) and my
utility of choosing the 1 marshmallow option is 0.9 mm’s. I always get more utility (measured in
mm’s) by choosing along the top curve.

6

Ross, D. (2011) p. 71.
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Fig. 2.2 Exponential Discounting II7

In reality, however, animals do not use exponential discounting, but rather give more weight
to events that are very immediate or very distant in time, and less weight to events at
intermediate times. This kind of attitude toward time is referred to as hyperbolic discounting.
Hyperbolic discounting occurs when goods at very short and very long delays would be valued
as they would be in exponential discounting, but goods in the middle would be valued less. In
other words, in hyperbolic discounting, a good is discounted very rapidly for small delay periods,
but then discounted slowly for longer delay periods. This contrasts with exponential discounting,
in which goods are discounted by a constant factor per unit delay, regardless of the total length of
the delay.
The figure below shows exponential and hyperbolic curves for the same interval from a
starting point to a future payoff. The bottom curve graphs the hyperbolic function; its bowed
shape results from the change in the rate of discounting.8

7

Ibid.
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Fig. 2.3 Comparison: Exponential vs. Hyperbolic Discounting9

In humans, a simple experiment can determine a test subject's hyperbolic discounting curve.
The subject is asked: "Would you prefer a dollar today or three dollars tomorrow?" and "Would
you prefer a dollar in one year or three dollars in one year and one day?" A significant number of
subjects will take the lesser amount today, but will gladly wait one extra day in a year in order to
receive the higher amount instead.10 But this is the same choice, seen one year in advance. The
formula for hyperbolic discounting is: Value =”Objective Value”/(1 +(Discount rate x Delay).
Where Value represents the present, subjective value of a reinforcer (money); Objective Value is
a specific amount of the reinforcer ($1 or $3), which is to be delivered after a delay. Delay is the
amount of time passed until the reinforcer is presented, and Discount rate is a parameter that
reflects the rate of discounting.

8

Ainslie, G. (2001) p. 31.

9

Ross, D. (2011) p. 70.
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Individuals who hyperbolically discount the future reveal a strong tendency to make choices
that are inconsistent over time: they make choices today that their future self would prefer not to
make. This phenomenon is called dynamic inconsistency. Dynamic inconsistency occurs because
the value of rewards between the immediate and distant future (medium term future rewards) is
much lower under hyperbolic discounting than under exponential discounting.
The figure below shows this situation. In this case, an individual is given a choice between a
smaller, sooner and larger, later reward. The discount curve drawn for the smaller, sooner reward
crosses the curve for the larger, later, and her preferences reverse.

Fig. 2.4 Hyperbolic Discounting 11

10
11

Thaler, R. H. (1981) p. 202.
Ross, D. ( 2011) p. 71.
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To use my marshmallow example, assume I was offered the same choice of one
marshmallow eight minutes from now or two marshmallows nine minutes from now. On the
graph below, the curve with the big spike represents the two marshmallow payoff and the curve
with the little spike represents the one marshmallow payoff. As the graph illustrates, I would
prefer the two marshmallow payoff to the one marshmallow payoff at all times before I reached
the 7 ½ minute mark, at which point I would switch my preference so that I would prefer the one
marshmallow payoff. So, at 7 ½ minutes I would choose the one marshmallow reward, even
though I would only have had to wait 1 ½ more minutes to receive the larger payoff.

Fig. 2.5 Hyperbolic Discounting 12
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3. THE EVIDENCE FOR HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING IN PRIMATES

There is a great deal of evidence that primates engage in hyperbolic discounting of the future.
Two studies, one performed by Woolverton at al. and another by Freeman et al., are of particular
interest because of their conclusions about how primates discount future rewards.
Woolverton et. al. examined delay discounting of cocaine injections in rhesus primates.13
Woolverton’s experiment started with two levers in a cage with a white light on over each lever.
When a primate was placed in the cage, the experimenter would conduct an experimental
“session” consisting of 20 trials. A trial consisted of a pressed lever followed by an injection of
cocaine. One lever would give an immediate reward dose of cocaine, whereas the other lever
would give a delayed reward dose that was always constant, delivered after a delay. A break was
instituted after every trial.
Woolverton et. al. found that primates discounted doses of cocaine according to a hyperbolic
function. They also found that the frequency with which immediate cocaine was chosen
increased with the dose. They concluded that primates discount high doses of cocaine at a
relatively low rate, suggesting that drug choice is not impulsive but, rather, a planned behavior.
In another study, Freeman et. al14 found that rhesus primates’ discounting functions for
saccharin is also described by hyperbolic discounting. In conjunction with Woolverton et al.,
Freeman et al. found that discounting functions for saccharin were steeper than with cocaine,
indicating that primates are more impulsive when choosing between smaller, sooner and larger,
later rewards of saccharin than between similar rewards of cocaine

12

Ibid.

13

Woolverton, W.L. et al. (2007).
Freeman, K. B., et al.. (2009).
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4. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE EVIDENCE

4.1 Cognitivist Interpretations

A cognitivist, as I use the term, believes in causal transactions between mental states and
physical movements in animals. Such mental states might include the animals’ beliefs, desires,
feelings, and perceptions. Such physical movements include behavior. Thus, cognitivism refers
to cases where a mental state impacts a physical reaction: for instance, the mental state of a
primate perceiving a cup of juice and desiring to ingest that cup of juice affects the physical
event of that primate grabbing the cup of juice and drinking it.
This version of cognitivism (with a little c) is different from Cognitivism (with a big C) which
posits that humans and other animals make overriding judgments that dictate their choices.
Under this latter version of Cognitivism, the mind functions as a central planner that commands
advanced organisms to behave in certain ways. According to this account, the mind calculates
the value of different options, and chooses the one that leads to the greatest reward. When an
animal with a mind chooses a suboptimal option or makes an impulsive decision, this is because
of an error within that mind’s calculative process.15 This version of Cognitivism is not the
version that this dissertation is discussing. The version that I am defending, cognitivism, states
that mental events affect physical behavior in certain ways. As I will discuss later, Cognitivism
(with a big C), but not cognitivism (with a little c), is actually undermined by my War of
Interests model of the primate mind.
The cognitivist would point to delay of gratification behavior in the hyperbolic discounting
studies as evidence for her thesis. In the hyperbolic discounting studies, the primates’ ability to

16
resist the temptation of choosing the smaller, sooner reward in order to choose the larger, later
reward indicates that their mental states have some control over their behavior. If mental states
had no causal impact, then the primates would never resist the temptation to grab the smaller,
sooner reward. Instead, they would always grab the smaller, sooner reward at the point when it is
valued more highly than the larger, later reward. No mechanism of action exists that can
plausibly explain behavior involving delay of gratification, other than causally efficacious mental
states. Thus, hyperbolic discounting cannot be thought of as a purely behavioral phenomenon.

4.2 Behaviorist Interpretations

The Skinnerian behaviorist would have a different interpretation of the evidence. Skinnerian
behaviorism claims to explain animal behavior in terms of five criteria: “external physical
stimuli, responses, learning histories, deprivation and reinforcements.” 16
For example, if a primate gets rewarded with an injection of cocaine every time he presses a
lever when a light above the lever turns on, then the likelihood of the primate pressing the lever
when the light turns on is increased. The injections of cocaine are reinforcements, the length of
time in between reinforcements is deprivation, the light is the external physical stimulus, the
lever pressings are the responses, and the learned associations between light, lever and cocaine
injection are the learning histories.17
The term “conditioning” is used to describe the processes involved in acquiring learned
associations or learning histories. The primate is being conditioned to learn that pressing a lever,

15
16
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when the light is on, causes food to appear. Similarly, primates are being conditioned in the
above experiments to hyperbolically discount goods, and their decisions are reinforced every
time they receive a reward.
Freeman’s study (2009), which examined delayed discounting of saccharine juice reward in
primates, presented primates with a choice between one of two levers. A white light was
illuminated over each lever. Each time a lever was pressed, the white lights were terminated, and
red lights were illuminated in their place. If the response was on the immediate-delivery lever,
the saccharin was immediately delivered and the red lights were terminated at the end of
saccharin delivery. If the response was on the delay lever, there was a delay to saccharin delivery
during which the red lights over that lever flashed once per second until saccharin delivery. After
every lever press (every trial), the experimenters waited exactly ten minutes before presenting
the primates with another choice between the two levers.
For the Skinnerian, the most revealing part of the experiment is this: The first four trials (two
for each lever) were forced-choice (sampling) trials. In these trials the primates didn’t get to
choose at all; they were just exposed to the rewards of both levers.
Just as in the cocaine example, the Skinnerian would say that in the forced choice trials, the
primates were conditioned to press the lever that maximized their subjective utility. Thus, all the
behavior in the experiment, including delay of gratification, can be explained in terms of
conditioning, external physical stimuli, responses, learning histories and reinforcements. No
causally efficacious, intentional, content-full, representational mental states are needed to explain
behavior, according to the Skinnerian.

18
5. THE EVIDENTIAL STALEMATE

Thus, an evidential stalemate exists between the cognitivist and the Skinnerian, which is
focused on exactly how one explains delay of gratification behavior and hyperbolic discounting.
Each would claim that its interpretation best explains the limited data. For example, Woolverton
et al. examined gratification behavior involving cocaine injections by rhesus primates. An
experimental trial consisted of a pressed lever followed by a 10 second injection of cocaine. One
lever would give an immediate reward dose of cocaine that ranged in size (from .012 to 0.4
mg/kg/injection), whereas the other lever would give a delayed reward dose that was always the
same 0.2 mg/kg/injection, delivered after a delay that varied between 0 and 300 seconds,
depending on the session. A 10 minute break was instituted after every trial.
Each 10 trial block started with two “forced” cocaine injections followed by eight “free”
cocaine injections. During the forced sample trials, primates were exposed to the different
consequences of each lever. For the next eight trials, the primates were given a choice between
the lever that granted the immediate reward, and the lever that granted the delayed reward. The
strength of the free doses granted by the levers was the same strength as the doses in the forced
sample trials. Data was recorded regarding which lever the primate pressed. After 10 trials, the
levers were reversed (i.e. the right lever changed from granting the immediate reward, to
granting the delayed reward).
After each 20 trial session, the strength of the immediate reward dose and the time delay
before the second dose in the delayed reward were changed, until the primates were indifferent to
the immediate dose and the delayed dose (That is, they were as likely to chose the immediate
reward as the delayed reward.)

19
The study found that the primates’ discount rate of cocaine can be modeled by a hyperbolic
function. The most relevant finding of this study, however, was that the primates were able to
delay gratification to attain the larger later cocaine injection.

Figure 5.1 One Session of the Experiment18

The cognitivist would interpret this study as evidence that the primates make decisions to
delay gratification and choose larger later rewards. In the experiment, primates choose the sooner
reward when it becomes large enough. They choose the later reward when sooner reward is small
18
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enough, indicating that they respond to the size of the rewards, and make judgments about which
rewards to choose. In other words, their behavior is malleable to circumstance.
The fact that the experiment was counterbalanced to exclude reinforcement learning of one
lever press shows that the lever pressings were not just a series of associated learned behaviors.
The primates were actually making decisions.
The Skinnerian, on the other hand, would interpret the evidence differently. While it is true
that the primates in the experiment learned that just pressing a certain lever does not equal a
greater reward at all times, the Skinnerian may claim that the behavioral phenomena in the
experiment can still be explained by conditioning. The experience of the two forced trials in the
experiment conditioned the primates to choose the lever that gave them the most utility, given
the magnitude of reward and the delay of reward. In other words, the primates’ participation in
the forced trials created a learning history, to which the primates simply gave behavioral
responses.
The problem is that these classically different, competing interpretations of the data will
always be available in any experiment like Woolverton’s. That is, both the cognitivist and the
Skinnerian will be able to claim support from any experiment about hyperbolic discounting or
delay of gratification that creates a learning history before the opportunity is given to choose
between alternatives. The Skinnerian interprets the behaviors that delay gratification as the
consequence of a learning history: which is just a series of associations created by
reinforcements. The cognitivist interprets these behaviors as evidence of conscious primate
decision-making, which requires causally efficacious mental states. I call this problem the
evidential stalemate. This problem is particularly difficult to resolve because non-human
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primates don’t have language. Thus, it is difficult to teach them new behaviors, and they can’t
self-report as to whether they are making conscious decisions or not.
To nullify the Skinnerian’s argument that hyperbolic discounting and delay of gratification
can be completely explained without referencing mental states, we need evidence that the
primates employ quickly arising, complex, goal-oriented, novel behaviors to delay gratification.
If no prior conditioning took place in an experiment where the primates were able to employ
these quickly arising, complex, goal-oriented, novel behaviors in order to delay gratification, the
Skinnerian explanation would be inadequate to explain the primates’ behavior.

5.1 Justification for the Evidential Standard Thesis

Thus, to adjudicate between the Skinnerian and cognitivist, we need: evidence that primates
have the capacity to delay gratification by employing quickly arising, complex, goal-oriented,
novel behaviors. Such behaviors will not have been conditioned at a previous point in time. I call
this the Evidential Standard Thesis (EST). This holds because the Skinnerian has no resources
for explaining quickly arising, complex, goal-oriented, novel behavior that hasn’t been
reinforced.
Novel behavior can arise under operant conditioning, and then be reinforced, so evidence of
novel behavior alone is not enough to refute the Skinnerian’s position. The way operant
conditioning works, according to the Skinnerian, is that an organism has a small chance of
performing a given novel behavior, and then the organism gets rewarded for that behavior so it
performs the same behavior again. That’s how goal oriented behavior evolved, according to the
Skinnerian. Skinner, however, can only explain complex behavior when each constituent part of
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the behavior has been rewarded. This is problematic for the Skinnerian, because the probability
of the conjunction of the constituent parts of a complex, goal-oriented, behavior randomly
occurring is very small. It’s almost like positing a miracle, for the Skinnerian.
For example , a piece of the evidence that serves as an example of a quickly arising, complex,
goal-oriented, novel behavior comes from observations made by primatologist Mathias Osvath.
Osvath reports that a chimpanzee concealed piles of concrete disks (or stones) for future stonethrowing. The chimpanzee calmly gathered and manufactured ammunition, and then threw the
ammunition at visitors to the zoo when the zoo opened hours later.
In order to explain this stone throwing ape, the Skinnerian must claim that each of the
constituent novel behaviors arouse randomly and were reinforced: the ape seeing the visitors,
finding the stones, gathering the stones into one place, sitting and acting calmly for hours,
making himself angry, finding the stones again, and then throwing the stones. If we assign a
1/10 probability19 for each constituent part of this behavior arising, then the odds of this entire
behavior occurring are 1/10,000,000. It’s nearly impossible for the behavior to arise in any
reasonably fast timeframe. Thus, any behavior that is quickly arising, complex, goal-oriented,
novel , and that hasn’t been reinforced undermines the Skinnerian’s position because the
probability of a successful Skinnerian explanation of this behavior is very low.
The specific behaviors that the primates use to delay gratification may vary. For example, in
one experiment a primate might attempt to delay gratification of a smaller sooner reward by
playing with its tail while the smaller sooner reward is present, thereby diverting its attention. In
another experiment, a primate might commit to choosing a larger later reward, before the choice
of smaller sooner or larger later reward becomes available. This can be done by pressing a lever
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These odds are very generous to the behaviorist, the real odds of each constituent behavior occurring is probably
much lower.
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ahead of time, before the smaller sooner reward becomes available. In this case, the primate
would make it physically impossible to choose the smaller sooner reward. Any evidence that
meets the EST undermines the Skinnerian position and supports the cognitivist position.20
Thus, the scientific Skinnerian must make a specific prediction: no quickly arising, complex,
goal-oriented, novel behavior will appear other than behavior that has been reinforced during the
training phase of the experiment, that allows delays of gratification.
In contrast, the cognitivist predicts that new quickly arising, complex, goal-oriented behaviors
will emerge that were not reinforced and that did not appear during the training phase of the
experiment.

In sum, the cognitivist theory makes the following claims:
1) Some primates’ mental states have a causal role in affecting their behavior
2) New, complex, goal-oriented behaviors will emerge in the course of a few number of
attempts to delay gratification, during the experiments.
The Skinnerian theory, on the other hand, makes the following claims:
1) Not a single mental state possessed by any primates has a causal role in affecting their
behavior.
2) New, complex, goal-oriented behaviors will not emerge in the course of a few
number of attempts to delay gratification, during the experiments.
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Of course, in any experiment with any animal, the entire learning history of the subject is hard to know. In theory,
this fact about the limitations of experimental design would allow the Skinnerian surmise that any quickly arising,
complex, goal-oriented, novel behaviors behavior was reinforced at a prior point in time. For example, if a primate
exhibits what appears to be novel behavior in an experiment, the Skinnerian could say the behavior was reinforced
before the experiment, when the primate was not being observed. If the Skinnerian takes this tack, however, then her
hypothesis becomes non-falsifiable, because she can use this answer to invalidate the results of any experiment
which falsifies her theory, and her hypothesis ceases to be a scientific hypothesis.
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Thus, the EST gives a clear bright-line of adjudication: a clear criterion of falsifiability to the
second claim of both theories. If we see the behavior described by the EST, then the
behaviorist’s second claim is falsified; if we do not, then the cognitivist’s second claim is
falsified. If we find evidence that meets the EST, then both of the cognitivist claims are verified.
In this case, the cognitivist theory is more accurately predictive (in that it posits that the primates
will engage in quickly arising, complex, goal-oriented, novel behaviors) and it explains more
(i.e. it explains why the primates engage quickly arising, complex, goal-oriented, novel
behaviors). If we fail to find evidence that meets the EST, then the Skinnerian theory’s second
claim is verified and her first claim becomes more plausible.21
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Another way of formulating the EST is that behavior will emerge in the primate experiments that cannot easily be
explained by stimulus, reinforcement, deprivation and response. According to the Skinnerian, all behavior can be
explained by these four factors. If these factors are not sufficiently explanatory of quickly arising, complex, goaloriented novel behavior in an experiment, then behavior must be caused by something else, namely causally
efficacious mental states. Of course, the Skinnerian could always claim that these four factors are present in any
behavior, and thus have an ad hoc reply to any potential observation that seemed to falsify her thesis. If the
Skinnerian specified exactly what the stimulus, reinforcer and deprivation were in the context of an experiment, and
then correctly predicted exactly what the response of the primate was, then her theory would be corroborated and her
hypothesis would be more plausible than the cognitivist hypothesis. This is because the behaviorist hypothesis
would be more parsimonious: it could explain the data by positing fewer entities than the cognitivist hypothesis. In
absence of such specific definitions and predictions by the Skinnerian, the first formulation of EST provides a
clearer standard for adjudicating between the rival claims of the Skinnerian and the cognitivist.
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6. THE EVIDENCE

6.1 Evidence that Supports the Cognitivist

Next, I will argue that two categories of empirical evidence support the cognitivist and meet
the evidential requirement of the Evidential Standard Thesis.
The first is the deployment of certain behavior tactics that allow the primates to delay
gratification. Three such tactics are: desire dampening, ability inhibiting and self-strengthening.
A tactic is a desire dampening tactic if and only if the tactic is used by a primate to reduce the
reward guaranteed by an alternative course of behavior. For example, if a primate knows that she
won’t have access to water for many hours, she might choose to refrain from eating a thirstinducing food substance, thereby dampening her desire for water.
A tactic is an ability-inhibiting tactic if and only if the tactic is used by a primate to block the
execution of another behavior and make the execution of the other behavior impossible for as
long as the tactic is employed. For example, a primate may shift his attention from an immediate
small reward to avoid choosing it over a larger later reward.
A tactic is a self-strengthening tactic if and only if the tactic is used by a primate to increase
the reward guaranteed by a behavior or to facilitate the reward granting behavior. For example, if
a primate wants to initiate a dominance display, he may “psych himself up” and try to make
himself angry in order to facilitate the execution of his display.
If these tactics are not rewarded during the experiments, and the primates still use them to
delay gratification, then we may say the primates’ behavior is not reinforced, and that the tactics
are evidence for the cognitivist position, under the Evidential Standard Thesis.
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The second category of evidence that supports the cognitivist is evidence that shows that
primates can plan for the future.
In the next sections, I review the evidence, which qualifies under the Evidential Standard
Thesis, that primates have the capacity to delay gratification by employing novel behaviors, i.e.
behaviors that have not been conditioned at a previous point in time. Later I’ll argue that in order
to plan for the future, a primate must be able to mentally represent the future.

6.2 Tactics that Primates Use to Delay Gratification

Reviewing the primate literature, we see many behavioral tactics used by primates to delay
gratification that satiate a larger later reward at the expense of satiating a smaller sooner reward.
Three major kinds of tactics exist: 1) desire dampening, 2) ability inhibiting, and 3) selfstrengthening tactics.
Preparation of emotion22 is a self-strengthening technique that is used by primates to delay
gratification. When a primate prepares emotions, she cultivates or inhibits motivational processes
that function to attain rewards. A primate might try to make himself angry in order help scare off
a rival conspecific, for example. The preparation of emotion can also be used to cultivate one
emotion in order to forestall the development of a contrary one. For example, a primate may
cultivate an emotion to care for offspring, and thereby forestall a short term desire to eat or sleep
in the immediate moment.
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Ainslie, G. (2001) p.77.
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Osvath provides evidence that apes prepare emotions in order to plan for the future, and
therefore forestall a short term interest to satiate a long term interest. In his article, 23 Osvath
reports that a chimpanzee concealed piles of concrete disks (or stones) for future stone-throwing.
The chimpanzee was calm during gathering or manufacturing of the ammunition, in contrast to
the typically aroused state right before and during displays (Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1 Male Chimpanzee, Right Before Display. The male appears with a stone in his left
hand. The forceful bipedal locomotion and the pilo erection (hair on end) are signs of
agitation.24

The gathering and manufacturing was observed during the hours before the zoo opened,
excluding potential triggering from the presence of zoo visitors. The delay between the gathering
23
24

Osvath , M. (2009)
Osvath , M. (2009) p. 191.
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and the throwing of the stones was typically several hours. The chimpanzee discovered the
production and use of concrete discs, as these behaviors had never been shown to him.
Thus, the evidence suggests that the chimpanzee cultivated one emotional state while
planning for his display (calm), was able to change his emotional state by getting riled up, or
cultivating an emotion (anger) right before the display (Figure 6.1), and preserved his new
emotional state during the display. We can infer that the chimp was able to cultivate the emotion
by himself, without external triggers, because the zoo visitors were absent during the initial
planning stage of the display. Furthermore, the chimp’s emotion-cultivating behaviors had never
been rewarded in the past.
Another method by which a primate can delay gratification is via the control of attention.25
Control of attention is an ability inhibiting tactic that is used by primates to delay gratification
because it is very good at precluding short term urges. Humans often employ this tactic. For
example, if you know a seductive reward is available, you try to avoid thinking about it.
Someone struggling to maintain a diet may divert her attention away from an attractive desert.
In an important study, Ding et al. (2006)26 found that given a choice between smaller sooner
and larger later rewards, primates achieved satiation of the larger later reward by suppressing
their gaze towards the non-preferred target (the smaller sooner reward) rather than moving their
gaze towards a preferred target (the larger later reward). In the experiment, a primate would first
fixate on a central point. After a waiting period, two targets were displayed: On one side of the
primate’s visual field was a large reward, on the other side was a small reward. The waiting
period and the position of the larger and smaller rewards (left or right side of the visual field)
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were varied. The authors concluded that the primates were able to delay gratification by
diverting their attention away from the seductive, but less valuable, target.27 The attention
diverting behavior was novel, in that the primates had not been trained or conditioned to divert
their attention away from the less desirable target. The behavior was goal-oriented in that it
allowed the primates to acquire the larger later reward, and it appeared relatively quickly after
the experiment had begun. Thus, it meets the EST and undermines the Skinnerian position.
A desire-dampening technique used to delay gratification is to arrange for some extrapsychic device,28 or external control or influence, that makes a future alternative less desirable.
In humans, illustrative examples include taking Antabuse, checking in to a “fat-farm,” setting up
a binding contract not to satiate a short term interest, or cultivating friends with particular
expectations.29 This is a tactic many animals use to delay gratification. Naqshbandi and Roberts30
found that squirrel monkeys do pre-commit to choosing smaller amounts of food over larger
amounts, in order to reduce a greater need to satisfy thirst later. They compared squirrel monkeys
to rats. They based their study on a standard self-control paradigm where the animals were
offered a choice between two amounts of the same type of food, one larger and the other smaller.
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Hayden et al.(2007) conducted a similar study to test risk sensitivity in rhesus macaques. In the study, a macaque
was put in a cage in front of a computer screen. Trials began when a fixation cue ( a small central square) appeared
on the screen. Two response targets appear on opposite sides of the fixation spot. Following a 1 second decision
period, the central cue was extinguished, indicating that the macaques’ gaze must be shifted to either of the two
targets within 100 m/sec. Following the choice, all stimuli were extinguished and a reward was delivered. One target
would deliver 150 ms of fluid, and the other target would deliver 50 ms or 250 ms of fluid. Whether the second
target delivered 50 ms or 250 ms of fluid was determined randomly. Following reward, the screen remains blank for
an inter-trial interval (ITI) of variable duration. A control experiment was then performed where one target would
always offer more than the other target, but the targets switched payoffs every 25 trials. The relevant finding in this
study is that the macaques were able to shift their gaze to the preferred target, even as the identity of the two targets
switched every 25 trials. Thus, the macaques were able to shift their attention (in this case measured in terms of
gaze) away from an undesirable reward onto a desirable reward.
28
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The food was thirst- inducing, and prior to the selection procedure the subject’s access to water
was blocked. If the subject chose the smaller amount of food the water would be restored after a
shorter interval (30 minutes) than if the animal selected the larger amount (180 minutes). This
meant that selecting the larger amount would not only induce more thirst, but also prolong the
waiting period for slaking the thirst. The hypothesis was that if the subjects were able to foresee
the future state of thirst, it would reverse the normal urge to select the larger food reward. If the
primates reversed preferences, they would be using an extra-psychic device (the smaller amount
of food) in order to dampen the desire for large amounts of water later on. The primates reversed
their preference, in contrast to the rats, who continued selecting the large reward. Thus,
Naqshbandi and Roberts made two important findings:

1) the primates were able to choose a more desirable long term option (quicker access to
water) by choosing a smaller amount of food ahead of time, and thereby used an extrapsychic device (the smaller amount of food) to dampen a future desire (the thirst they
would feel after eating the food) and satiate that desire quickly.31 The use of this extrapsychic device is a novel, complex, goal oriented behavior that meets the EST and
undermines the Skinnerian position.
2) The primates were able to use flexible cognitive prospection beyond the present need,
and plan for their future state of thirst.32 That is, their ability to mentally time travel into
the future, which was illustrated by their ability to plan, entails that they have mental
states with representational powers. The Skinnerian does not have the theoretical
resources for understanding a phenomenon such as mental time travel.
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Thus, desire dampening, ability inhibiting, and self strengthening tactics are used by primates
to delay gratification. Given hyperbolic discounting, if none of these tactics are used, the short
term interest will always win out over the long term interest. Since none of these tactics has been
reinforced during the training phase of any experiment, we can say they support the cognitivist
and meet the evidential requirement in the Evidential Standard Thesis.

6.3 Primate Planning Behavior

Primatologists Clayton et. al.33 define planning behavior in primates as: “behavior that
reflects the ability to anticipate future needs and desires independent of current needs and desires
and over longer timescales than the short timescales sufficient for instrumental responding such
as lever-pressing for food reward.” 34 Based on this definition, I propose two behavioral criteria,
which if met, will be sufficient evidence of planning behavior:

1) The behavior must not be instigated by, and must not satisfy, a present need.
2) The planned behavior, if successful, must satisfy a physical or psychological need that
will arise in the future.

The studies by Osvath (2009) and Naqshbandi (2006) 35 not only provide evidence of certain
behavioral tactics used by primates in delaying gratification; they also provide evidence that
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primates can plan for the future.36 In order to plan for the future, primates must be able to
mentally represent the future, and if mentally representing the future is a prerequisite for
planning behavior, then we can say primates’ mental states have a role in affecting their physical
behavior, and thus corroborate the cognitivist position.
Additional evidence, also provided by Osvath, corroborates the claim that primates can plan
for the future. In a series of four experiments based on tool use, Osvath demonstrated that
chimpanzees and orangutans override immediate drives in favor of future needs, and they do not
merely rely on associative learning37 or semantic prospection38 when confronted with a planning
task.
Osvath and colleagues taught three apes to use a large straw to obtain a larger amount of fruit
flavored soup.39 The apes were then relocated to a room and given a choice between a number of
items, one of which was the straw. All picked the straw. Three other apes that had not been
introduced to the fruit soup were also given a choice of the same items. These new apes did not
select the straw more often than any other item. The naïve apes were used specifically to test for
the possibility of bias in either the materials or the selection procedures used.40 No such bias was
found.
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The primates in Naqahbandi et al.’s study were able to anticipate and satiate a future need (thirst for water) by
diminishing their satiation of their present need (hunger for thirst inducing food). The chimpanzee that Osvath
observed was not moved by his current state of calm to gather stones; instead, he was moved by a later need to
exhibit dominance, which he exhibited by throwing the stones.
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Osvath postulated that this experiment showed that apes could possibly have future oriented
cognition, but he admitted that the results could have also been the product of associated
learning, or behavioral conditioning.41
In Osvath’s second experiment, the three original chimps were offered the same selection of
items as in experiment 1, but a piece of fruit, a grape, was added to the items. Because the
primates were only able to choose one item, this experiment tested the ability of the apes to delay
gratification and display self control in order to pick the straw.42 The experiment was run many
times. One of the chimpanzees selected the straw in 79% of the time, the other 57%; while the
orangutan chose it 64% of the time. In all other cases, the subjects chose the grape.43 Because the
experiment was repeated many times, Osvath concluded that the primates were most likely
anticipating that they would be reintroduced to the fruit soup in the future, and therefore planned
for the future by picking the straw over the grape.
Osvath’s third experiment was designed to control for associative learning or behavioral
conditioning, which Osvath admitted could have explained the results of experiment 2. That is,
the chimps could have formed an association between the fruit soup and the straw together,
which would have led to them to place an intrinsic value on the straw, because they learned to
associate it with the fruit soup. If this was the case, then the chimps would not have engaged in
any planning behavior.
In experiment 3, the three original apes were allowed to select two objects from two different
trays. The first tray contained three distracter items and the straw. The apes were allowed to
41

Ibid.

42

The straw was the only item they could use to obtain the fruit soup, which was not yet present, but would be
available to the apes in the future.
43

Osvath, M. (2010).

34
choose one item. The apes were then allowed to pick one item from a second tray, which
contained the three distracter items, the straw and the grape. All the apes chose the straw in the
first tray and the grape in the second tray. If the straw had any “associatively learned intrinsic
value”,44 the apes would have most likely chosen it in the second tray as well as in the first tray.
The fact that the apes all chose the grape in the second tray and the straw in the first tray,
precluded the possibility that the straw had any intrinsically learned value. If associative learning
was responsible for the chimps picking the straw in Osvath’s second experiment, then they
would have picked the straw on both trays in the third experiment as well. That is, the Skinnerian
is committed to the claim that associative learning can explain the chimps’ straw picking
behavior; so she would claim that the chimps would always pick the straw, which the Skinerian
claims has high intrinsic value, over the grape, which has lower intrinsic value. This was not the
result of Osvath’s experiment. Thus, the Skinnerian position is undermined by the combined
results of experiment 2 and 3.
In experiment 4, the final experiment, Osvath wanted to test whether the apes were able to use
flexible cognition to relate to particularities of the future. Such an ability would indicate that apes
can mentally time travel, and mentally represent the future.
The original three apes were presented with three novel items and one familiar item. The
straw was not among the items presented to the apes, although one of the novel items could be
used to siphon fruit soup from its container, even though it looked and functioned differently
from the original straw. The familiar item presented with the novel items was a bamboo stick,
which the apes had used previously to extract honey from a log. The apes were allowed to
visually inspect each item, and then were allowed to select only one of them. In the twelve trials

44

Ibid.

35
of the experiment, the apes selected the functional but novel looking siphoning tool significantly
more than any of the other items.45 Osvath also ran the same experiment with the three apes who
had never been exposed to the fruit soup, and he found that they did not significantly pick out
any item more than the other items.46
The parsimonious explanation of the combined results of these studies suggest that great apes
engage in planning for the future by out-competing current drives and mentally pre-experiencing
an upcoming event. This suggests that the advanced mental capacities utilized in human future
planning are shared by primates.
Thus, evidence of novel behavioral tactics to delay gratification and evidence of primate
planning behavior meets the requirement set by the Evidential Standard Thesis, and thus supports
the cognitivist position and undermine the Skinnerian’s position.

6.4 A Review of the Evidence

At this point, we know that the evidence reviewed above about hyperbolic discounting shows
us that primates’ inter-temporal preferences are in conflict with each other.47 When a smaller
sooner interest and larger later interest are incompatible, tactics are sometimes deployed by the
primate so that the larger later interest may achieve satiation at the expense of the smaller sooner
interest. If tactics are not deployed successfully by the primate, then the smaller sooner interest
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will always be satiated at the expense of the larger later interest, because primates discount
hyperbolically.
Furthermore, we know that the behavioral tactics observed in many experiments show us that
primates’ mental states affect their behavior. These tactics also show us how primates’ interests,
which are mental states, compete with each other for satiation. This set of observations, in effect,
adjudicates the evidential stalemate. It shows that the mental states of primates affect their
physical behavior.

7. THE WAR OF INTERESTS

7.1 Why Primates Engage in Hyperbolic Discounting

Hyperbolic discounting might have evolved in order to maximize a primate’s fitness.48 It
would seem that the fitness of an organism would be maximized by exponential discounting.
Remember, a hyperbolic discounter gives more weight to rewards that are very immediate or
very distant in time, and less weight to rewards at intermediate times.49 This would seem to put a
hyperbolic discounter at a disadvantage compared to an exponential discounter for two reasons.
First, the hyperbolic discounter is at a disadvantage because a good that ripens in the medium
term would have much less value to a hyperbolic discounter than to an exponential discounter.
Thus, a hyperbolic discounter might well be at a disadvantage when trading with an exponential
discounter. Second, the hyperbolic discounter would select the poorer but earlier of two
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Fitness, for purposes of this paper, describes the ability to of a primate to both survive and reproduce.

That is, hyperbolic discounting occurs when goods at very short and very long delays are valued like they are in
exponential discounting, but goods in the middle are valued less.
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alternative rewards right before the poorer reward becomes available.50 The exponential
discounter would not make such a choice: her preferences never switch.
However, the adaptiveness of hyperbolic discounting makes sense when an organism is
confronted with both stable and unstable environments throughout the course of its lifetime.
Rather than replacing a whole hyperbolic discounting system with an exponential discounting
system, an evolving organism that had to function successfully might have evolved hyperbolic
discounting and behavioral tactics that forestall hyperbolic discounting as a way to cope with the
challenges of living in both stable and unstable environments.
A graph of the hyperbolic and exponential discount curves for one good (say, a food item)
will look like this:
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Fig. 7.1 Hyperbolic vs. Exponential Discount Functions 51

As the graph illustrates, the hyperbolic discount function predicts that the expected utility of a
good initially decreases at a faster rate but then decreases at a slower rate than would be
predicted by an exponential function fit to the same data.52 The prediction made by the
hyperbolic curve makes sense when the environment shifts from stable to unstable and then back
again. In an environment that is rapidly changing, the odds of attaining a food item decrease
substantially as time passes, because there is increased risk that something will happen to prevent
51
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a primate from attaining the food item. In this circumstance, it makes sense to grab the nearest
food item and avoid delaying at all cost. But when the environment stabilizes, the hyperbolic
curve predicts that each unit of time that passes adds successively smaller amounts of risk to the
primate’s foraging behavior, and thus the hyperbolic curve flattens out at long delays. In this
circumstance, it makes sense to use a behavioral tactic to delay gratification for a larger later
reward that is likely to be obtained. Thus, the hyperbolic curve seems to better predict the
primate’s optimal behavior when he has to forage in situations where the stability of the
environment is uncertain. In other words, a hyperbolic curve essentially embodies a defensible
assumption that rewards might disappear in the near term due to environmental fluctuations.
For example, imagine a scenario where a primate (let’s call him Joe) lives in a rainforest that
happens to be in the middle of monsoon season. If Joe sees a piece of fruit on the forest floor just
as it starts to rain, it is in his interest to grab the piece of fruit as quickly as he can, lest it be
washed away by the monsoon. But once the monsoon ends, it may be in Joe’s interest to forage
for other fruit, because there is little risk that the original piece of fruit will be washed away.
Thus, Joe has an incentive to value smaller sooner goods highly in fluctuating environments,
because the probability of attaining any goods decreases hyperbolically in such environments.
When the monsoon ends and the environment stabilizes, Joe then has an incentive to invest time
in searching for larger later goods, as is illustrated by the flattening of the hyperbolic discount
curve over long delays in Fig. 7.
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7.2 The War of Interests

What does the fact that primates hyperbolically discount, and then forestall the hyperbolic
discounting of smaller sooner rewards with behavioral tactics tell us about the primate mind? I
propose that we can model the primate mind on something like a democratic congress, where
different factions (or interests, in the case of the primate mind) bargain, battle, and form
coalitions with each other; all to win control of the primate’s behavior so that they (the interests)
may achieve satiation. These interests are generated by one part of the primate mind, which call
the “intuitive” system. The interaction of interests is then partly regulated and stabilized by
another part of the primate mind, a higher level system which call the “cognitive” system. I
reiterate that I present this War of Interests model as a general framework, not a finished theory
of the primate mind.
That is, I propose that two distinct systems exist in the primate mind. The first is the
“intuitive” system that includes the set of interests that exist in the primate mind. This system
specializes in quick emotional processing and is quickly responsive to stimuli in the
environment. It is this system that forces the primates to attain the smaller sooner rewards, in a
manner described by hyperbolic discount curves showing the primate’s preferences. As the
smaller sooner curve peaks over and before the larger later curve, the primate will always grab
the smaller sooner reward over the larger later reward, because of the intuitive system, unless a
second system intervenes.
The second system that exists in the primate mind, the “cognitive” system, attempts to
undermine certain interests in the intuitive system and attain larger later rewards at the expense
of smaller sooner rewards. This system functions essentially as a tool to undermine certain
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interests in the intuitive system. The cognitive system specializes in spatiotemporal mental
representations, employs different kinds of declarative memory, and allows the primate to
control its emotional state and to mentally time-travel into the past and future. It is the cognitive
system that allows the primate to resist the immediate temptation illustrated by the hyperbolic
discount curve, and thus to delay gratification. In essence, this system is a cluster of capacities
that come together to override the intuitive system when advantageous.
The intuitive system essentially causes primates to engage in hyperbolic discounting. That is,
the hyperbolic discount curves illustrate the intuitive system at work. When the payoff to the
reward(s) is distant, the long term interests in the intuitive system sets the larger later reward as
its target of desire. The primate values the larger later reward more than the smaller sooner
reward, until the time period right before the payoff of the smaller sooner reward: the point at
which the hyperbolic discount curves cross. At this point, the primate switches preferences to the
smaller sooner reward from the larger later reward. This intuitive system always moves the
primate to go for the smaller sooner reward over the larger later reward, unless the cognitive
system intervenes to forestall the intuitive system.
The intuitive system might have evolved in primates because it provides the impetus for fast
reactions to external stimuli. When a primate encounters a food source that requires fast action to
attain, the priorities that the intuitive system sets might be best. Using relatively little information
or processing power, the intuitive system is well-suited to make such decisions when the primate
is faced with scarce information and a limited time in which to act. The risk of losing rewards is
increased the longer the primate waits for food and delays gratification, because the probability
of finding a good (say, food) often decreases with time.53 In other words, the intuitive system

53

See graph of probability of attaining reward over time for both upper and lower EU curves. (See Probability
Curve 1 in the Appendix). It is important to distinguish between the percent probability of attaining a reward in the

42
may supply primates with “fast and frugal” heuristics54 which form the basis of the primate’s
decision-making process.
This theory is supported by a study conducted by Stevens et. al., which indicated that feeding
ecology plays a role in the evolution of primate strategies to procure food. Two closely related
primates—common marmosets and cotton-top tamarins-were studied by Stevens et al. in an
experiment in which individuals choose between taking an immediate small reward and waiting
a variable amount of time for a large reward. The study found that marmosets wait significantly
longer for food than do tamarins. Stevens et al. contend that this difference cannot be explained
by life history, social behavior or brain size. It can, however, be explained by feeding ecology:
marmosets rely on gum, a food product acquired by waiting for exudate to flow from trees,
whereas tamarins feed on insects, a food product requiring impulsive action. Tamarins’
“intuitive” system may be more developed because tamarins have faced selective pressures to
react quickly to potential sources of food, over their evolutionary history. If a primate evolved to
eat insects, then the probability of attaining larger later rewards by waiting and delaying
gratification is very low. There would be no need for tamarins to develop an advanced cognitive
system, a cognitive system that delays gratification might lead to less reward, because there is

future, and the value of a future reward, at the present point in time. For example, I might currently value a $10
reward five months from now at $2.50 (where I would be indifferent to $10 now and $2.50 five months from now),
even though I have a 100% probability of attaining both rewards. Or, I might value $10 five months from now the
same as I would value $10 now (where I would be indifferent to $10 now and $10 five months from now), only I
would have only a 25% chance of getting the $10 five months from now. The EU curves in these cases would look
the same, but the probability curves would be completely different. The graphs only account for decreasing
probability of reward and assume that a primate is indifferent to an immediate reward and a reward in the future, if
he knew he had 100% probability of attaining both rewards. This assumption is made in order to illustrate the effect
of scarce information and time on a primate’s decision making process. As delay to payoff increases, the probability
the primate will get the reward decreases. The longer the delay to payoff, the less information the primate has about
whether he will get the reward, which means he is less certain about getting the reward. Thus, both limited time and
information influence the probability the primate will attain the reward, which in turn influence the hyperbolic
discount curves. The less time and information a primate has, the more profitable it is to go for the smaller sooner
reward.
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substantial risk of the insects running off. Foraging ecology, therefore, may provide a selective
pressure for the evolution of the intuitive system.
Another reason the intuitive system might have evolved is that it serves as a default operating
system when the organism is faced with high levels of stress. When stress is low, the cognitive
system may take over and delay gratification, because it is in the primate’s advantage to
accumulate as much information about the environment as possible, so that it may be stored and
remembered for later use. But when stress is high, such as when the primate’s life is in danger,
certain fast responses generated by the primate’s intuitive system are essential. For example,
primates might need an impulsive, “flight” interest when they see a predator approaching. In this
case, there would be no time for a more calculative, strategic system to operate. In environments
of chronic stress, such as where the primate is frequently chased by a predator, the probability of
attaining a reward as a function of delay decreases, and the probability curve becomes much
more bowed.55 If the primate delays, he might die or get injured, and his reward quickly
decreases as a function of time passed. Chronic stress may upset the balance between the
cognitive and intuitive systems so that the intuitive system grows stronger while the cognitive
system grows weaker. Robert Sapolsky, Stanford professor of biology, has found that chronic
stress in primates reduces hippocampal volumes significantly.56 The hippocampus is associated
with different kinds of declarative memory, which are essential components of the cognitive
system.57 If we assume unstable environments are more stressful to live in than stable
environments, then stress may have an important adaptive function. The aforementioned
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Sapolsky evidence indicates that stress decreases hippocampal volumes in primates. Since the
hippocampus is essential to the functioning of the cognitive system, stress may work to the
primate’s advantage because it frees up the intuitive system to work over the disrupted cognitive
system. Thus, the function of stress in a primate’s evolutionary history may be a useful adaptive
feature of evolution.
The cognitive system might have evolved in order to enable primates to deal with the
complexities of their environment, to process the informative and cognitively sophisticated
functions of external stimuli in order to suppress the operation of the intuitive system. The
cognitive system is also responsible for producing the behavioral tactics mentioned in Section 4.
The first capacity of the cognitive system is declarative memory. Declarative memory, which
is partially responsible for visual learning ability in primates,58 allows primates to remember
events, conspicifics and the location of previously discovered food items. It also is useful in
tracking whether the environment is stable or unstable. Evidence suggests that as the primate
develops and matures, declarative memory becomes stronger. Bachevalier et al. (1984)
demonstrated that on a visual recognition task, learning ability improves with age in rhesus
primates.59 They concluded that declarative memory, which is part of the cognitive system in
primates, develops slowly in rhesus primates over the course of their maturation. Indeed, if the
cognitive system increases a primate’s evolutionary fitness, then primates who survive longer
will be more likely to have benefited from the use of this part of their cognitive system.
Importantly, declarative memory allows primates to mentally time travel into the past by
enabling their recall of past events. This allows the primates to use extra-psychic devices and
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commit to choosing a more desirable long term option by dampening a desire to choose a short
term option that would be less profitable. In the Naqshbandi and Roberts study, mental time
travel allowed the primates to remember the reward cycle that occurred during the training part
of the experiment. Once the primates had that knowledge, they were able to apply it in choosing
a smaller amount of food ahead of time, and thereby used an extra-psychic device (the smaller
amount of food) to dampen a future desire (the thirst they would feel after eating the food) and
satiate that desire quickly.
The other half of mental time travel in primates, time traveling into the future, is enabled by
their ability to form spatio-temporal mental representations. This ability allows them to discern
cause and effect relations and make associations between events, emotions and stimuli in the
environment. Bushnell et al60 showed that some parietal nerve cells in the brains of primates
have the capacity to shift into a high level of directed spatial attention. That is, primates have
evolved a kind of “cocktail party effect” where they are able to look in one direction and react to,
and therefore attend, stimuli in another direction.61 We saw this sophisticated ability to control
attention in the Ding et al. study in which primates were able to direct attention away from a
smaller sooner stimulus in order to gain a larger later reward. The ability to form spatiotemporal mental representations also enables complex skill sets, like object manipulation. For
example, one of Osvath’s observations of the chimps was that they used a bamboo tool to harvest
honey out of a log. Such an activity could only reflect the processes of this sophisticated part of
the cognitive system which allowed the primate to delay gratification and figure out how to use
the tool.
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Another aspect of the cognitive system allows primates to control their levels of arousal. V.
Mountcastle et al.62 found that primates are able to superimpose an extra, independent, higher
level of state control over a preexisting, basic level of arousal or vigilance.63 That is, primates
have the ability to affect their own level of arousal, so they can supercharge or cool down a given
interest in the intuitive system. This is precisely what happened in the case of Osvath’s stonethrowing ape.
Thus, the cognitive system enables primates to remember places and previous events
(declarative memory), which allows them to mentally time travel and form spatio-temporal
mental representations. It also allows them to control their levels of arousal. All these capacities
allow the cognitive system to stopgap the intuitive system. This function of the cognitive system
has obvious evolutionary advantages when the environment is stable. Innate physiological
conditions, such as good health and stable temperament may also aid the development of the
cognitive system. If a primate is disease-prone or temperamentally unstable, these factors could
create stress that would favor the intuitive system over the cognitive system. Environmental
resources and threats, which also effect primates stress levels, also help determine whether the
cognitive or intuitive system dominates.
All the sub-capacities of the cognitive system enable the most important function of the
cognitive system: to allow the primates to delay gratification. This ability confers the biggest
evolutionary advantage. If the cognitive system is able to override the smaller sooner interests in
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the intuitive system, then the primate will be able to attain bigger rewards over smaller rewards,
and thus gain a huge fitness advantage.
Here it is useful to list of the capacities that make up the cognitive system, how they help
primates maximize their fitness, and how they manifest themselves in the behavior of the
primates (Fig. 7.2).

Fig. 7.2 The Cognitive System and its Abilities

In sum, the intuitive system is both fast and frugal64 and creates impulsive responses to both
alluring and fear-producing stimuli. It processes all of the preferences, or interests, of the primate
and it generates the hyperbolic discount curves by which the primate values goods and makes
decisions. It is an emotional, instinctive system that increases its primacy when the primate faces
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increasing levels of stress. The cognitive system is a complex, nuanced memory and control
system that connects different mental representations and is responsible for mental time travel
and arousal control. It forestalls the intuitive system when it is the best interest of the primate to
delay gratification. It gains strength over time, is goal-sensitive, and is strategic. Non-impulsive
actions are enabled by this system, a system which is weakened by stress.

7.3 A Review of the Model

The cognitive system functions better than the intuitive system in more stable environments.
When the environment is not subject to large and sudden changes, a primate has more time to
process information, remember events and places, control its level of arousal and anticipate the
future. A stable environment makes it especially lucrative for a primate to delay gratification for
larger later rewards, for the primate can be much more assured that she will be more likely to
attain a larger later reward when events in the environment are more predictable and less subject
to change. By contrast, the intuitive system functions better than the cognitive system in unstable
environments when primates must make decisions under constraints of limited time and
information. An unstable environment makes the cognitive system slow and inefficient. A fast
system that uses little information, and guarantees a smaller sooner reward is of much more
value than a slow system which is not only unwieldy and inefficient in a rapidly changing
environment, but also does not guarantee any reward at all. When the environment is rapidly
changing, there is a much lower probability that a larger later reward will still be available after a
large amount of time has lapsed, as illustrated by Probability Curve 2 in the Appendix. Thus, the
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intuitive system is more useful, and better left unimpaired by the cognitive system, when the
environment is unstable.

7.4 Questions and Hypotheses Generated by the WOI Model

The model described above provides a useful framework for generating hypotheses and
asking new questions. The first hypothesis generated by my WOI model is that a primate will
always forgo the larger later reward when faced with a choice between smaller sooner or larger
later rewards, unless she deploys certain behavioral tactics in order to delay gratification. That is:
Hypothesis 1: if no behavioral tactics are deployed by a primate when the primate is
forced to choose between pursuing smaller sooner and larger later rewards, then the primate will
always pursue the smaller sooner reward.
This hypothesis can be tested by constructing an experiment where primates are forced to
choose between smaller sooner and larger later rewards. Such experimental paradigms are
presented by Woolverton et. al and Freeman et. al in their studies of hyperbolically discounting
primates. If no behavioral tactics arise, yet the primates are still able to delay gratification, then
the hypothesis has been falsified. If behavioral tactics do arise in every instance where
experimental subjects delay gratification, then the hypothesis has been confirmed.
If the hypothesis is proven to be false, then there may be another factor at work that is
separate from the cognitive system, that helps the primate delay gratification. If the hypothesis is
confirmed, then my WOI model becomes more plausible, as does the notion that one purpose of
the cluster of capacities that I call the “cognitive system” is to enable the primate to delay
gratification.
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No matter the result, hypothesis 1 raises the question of whether the primary purpose of the
cognitive system is to enable the monkey to delay gratification, or whether the cluster of
capacities in the cognitive system evolved other purposes. For example, a tactic used by the
cognitive system is the manipulation of attention. How do we know primates are manipulating
their attention for the express purpose of delaying gratification? There could be many reasons
primates manipulate their attention. For example, one such reason might be to notice and avoid
threats and predators. In that case, the manipulation of attention would appear to be a function of
the intuitive system, because it provides a fast response to an immediate environmental stimulus.
In the WOI model, the manipulation of attention tactic works by inhibiting the ability of the
primate to pursue smaller sooner rewards. It follows that one prediction made by my model is
that when the smaller sooner reward is made less salient65 in an experiment, perhaps by
introducing distracting items into the experiment, then the primate will be able to improve her
ability to delay gratification. The idea is that if it’s easier to manipulate attention, then it’s easier
to delay gratification for the primate. For example, if a brightly colored toy is put within the
grasp of the primate who is given a choice between smaller sooner and larger later rewards, then
the primate will be better equipped to shift his attention away from the smaller sooner reward to
the toy when the choice arises. That is:
Hypothesis 2: If salient distracter items are present when a primate is given a choice
between smaller sooner and larger later rewards, the primate will be more likely to successfully
delay gratification by manipulating her attention off of the smaller sooner reward.
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If the hypothesis is confirmed, my theory, that the cognitive system deploys this tactic mainly
for the purpose of forestalling the intuitive system,66 is corroborated. If the hypothesis is
falsified, then the primates may not be manipulating their attention in order to forgo smaller
sooner rewards. Their manipulation of their own attention could be a random or vestigial
behavior.
If decreasing the salience of the smaller sooner reward by introducing distracting items to the
primate increases the power of the cognitive system over certain interests in the intuitive system,
then it might be interesting to know just how unified the intuitive system is. Do primates
discount all goods, not just juice and cocaine, according to a hyperbolic function? For example,
would primates discount the desire to mate or associate with other conspecifics according to a
hyperbolic function?
To answer this question, a researcher may design an experiment with a similar paradigm to
the Freeman et. al and Woolverton et. al experiments, only with access to conspecifics as the
reward. For example, a primate may be kept in a cage where she can see her social group but
can’t interact with them. If she presses one lever, she is released immediately, but she only is
allowed a small amount of time to socialize with her social group. If she presses another lever,
her release is delayed, but once released she is allowed more time with her social group. My
model would predict that the primate would discount delayed release according to a hyperbolic
function. That is:
Hypothesis 3: If a primate is denied access to her social group of conspecifics, she will
discount access to them according to a hyperbolic function.
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If the hypothesis is confirmed, then we can assume that a number of very different interests
are unified in a primate in such a way that many of them can be accurately described by a
hyperbolic discount function, like my model suggests. If the hypothesis if falsified, then perhaps
different systems in the primate mind are responsible for different interests, and the plausibility
of my theory is reduced.
Hypothesis 3 also raises the interesting question of how primates social behavior influences
their decision making abilities and their ability to delay gratification, given hyperbolic
discounting. In other words, what are the effects of primates’ social behavior on my WOI model?
Primate social behavior is an enormously complex topic that is outside the scope of this
thesis, so the full effects of primate social behavior on my WOI model cannot be known. Primate
social behavior, however, can be relevant to my model in that a primate’s social rank is often
indicative of their level of stress.67 When a primate is isolated or low in the social hierarchy of
her social group, then stress is higher on the primate68 and, according to my WOI model, the
cognitive system decreases in primacy and the intuitive system increases in primacy. This leads
to my final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: As a primate’s status and level of stress rises and falls in her social group,
the primacy of her intuitive and cognitive systems should rise and fall accordingly, making her
more impulsive when she is low in the social hierarchy and more able to delay gratification
when she is high in the social hierarchy.
As noted in my analysis above, if hypothesis 4 is confirmed then my account of how stress
effects the cognitive an intuitive systems would be corroborated, as would my story of how these
systems evolved in reaction to various levels of environmental stress. If hypothesis 4 is falsified,
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then my analysis of the role of stress in creating and affecting the cognitive and intuitive systems
would be made dubious.

8. PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS

Traditionally, it has been assumed that primate minds are whimsical and impulsive.
Conventional wisdom assumes primates are only capable of reacting to the nearest external
stimuli. Evidence for this position comes from the common-sense observation, which is also
backed up by scientific evidence,69 that primates are more impulsive than humans, and discount
future rewards more steeply.
Some contemporary primatologists even affirm the Bischof-Kohler hypothesis, which states
that: “Animals other than humans cannot anticipate future needs or drive states and are therefore
bound to a present that is defined by their current motivational state.” 70 Clearly, this hypothesis,
which denies that primates can think about the past or the future, coupled with evidence that
primates discount the future more steeply than humans, suggests that primates only act in
response to environmental stimuli that are immediately present. Furthermore, this
evidence/hypothesis suggests that the primate mind is inattentive; it jumps from stimuli to
stimuli without ever focusing on one thing for a significant period in time. I call this theory the
ADHD theory of the primate mind.
Although there is some evidence in support of this theory, it is incorrect. As I have
demonstrated, primates do have some control over their actions. The fact that they discount
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future rewards more steeply than humans only suggests that they may not have as much selfcontrol as humans, not that they lack any self-control at all. Furthermore, primates do engage in
planning behaviors. The existence of these behaviors presupposes mental time-travel in primates,
which falsifies the Bischof-Kohler hypothesis.
On the other end of the spectrum is Cognitivism (with a big C), which posits that primates
and other animals make overriding judgments that dictate their choices. According to this theory,
the primate mind functions as a dictator that commands the primate to behave in certain ways.
Also according to this theory, the primate mind calculates the value of different options, and
chooses the one that leads to the greatest reward. When the primate mind chooses a suboptimal
option or makes an impulsive decision, this is because of an error within that mind’s calculative
process.71
At first glance, it may seem as if this theory is supported by my account. The intuitive system
does, indeed, contain interests for goods, and it sets values for those interests. These values can
be described by hyperbolic discount curves. The cognitive system kicks in, in some
circumstances, to choose the interest that leads to the greatest reward. Thus, it may seem as if the
cognitive system serves as the central planner of the mind that the Cognitivist had in mind. But
this would be a misreading of my account.
Unlike the Cognitivist, I contend that primates’ preferences are completely involuntary. The
Cognitivist contends that a person (or, in this case, a primate) has control over her preferences
and can set them accordingly.72 In other words, the Cognitivist contends that a primate chooses
her preferences, where a preference is a desire for one interest over an alternative interest, and an
interest is a desire for a good.
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The first problem with this account is that it fails to explain what it is that determines the
primates’ preferences. If the answer is that other, second-order preferences determine the
primates original preferences, this leads to an obvious regress: what determines the second-order
preference? Some other account of preference choice is needed, and there is no such account
available to the Cognitivist.
The second problem with the Cognitivist account is that it fails to explain dynamic
inconsistency, which is apparent in hyperbolic discounting. According to Cognitivism, the mind
functions as a central planner that commands advanced organisms to behave in certain ways.73
According to this theory, impulsiveness is just an error of judgment about how to get the greatest
reward, or how to pursue the favored interest.
That said, if the primate mind sets its own preferences, there should be no reversal of
preferences once the primate judges what interest she wants to pursue. If this were the case, then
the primate mind should seek the same reward over time and not reverse preferences. Yet, in all
the hyperbolic discounting studies I have presented, the primates do reverse preferences. Thus,
Cognitivism, as I have defined it, is not a plausible theory of the primate mind. Furthermore, it is
incompatible with my account which states that the primate mind is not a central planner but is
multifaceted, with different parts in conflict with one another.
When understanding the primate mind, the dichotomy between conceiving of it as a fully
controlled mind or a completely uncontrolled mind is false. That is, questions that ask: 1)
whether primates have full control over their actions, or 2) whether they are self-aware or not ,
miss the mark.
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What is needed is an intermediate account of the primate mind, that allows us navigate like
Odysseus between the six-headed monster of the ADHD theory, and the infinitely regressive
whirlpool of Cognitivism. My theory does this by clearly delineating the voluntary and
involuntary parts of the primate mind.
According to my theory, primates have a limited self-awareness that is provided by the
cognitive system. In other words, the cognitive system is geared towards monitoring the activity
of the intuitive system when it performs in a way detrimental to the fitness of the primate. My
theory does not posit that primates possess a general self awareness,74 but it does posit that they
possess an awareness of their own preferences or desires. In my account, the cognitive system is
just a tool used by certain interests (larger later interests) to forestall other interests (smaller
sooner interests), where a preference is a desire for one interest over an alternative interest, and
an interest is a desire for a good. The intuitive system contains all the interests and is completely
involuntary. If it were not involuntary, then my account of the intuitive system would be plagued
by the same regress that plagues Cognitivism: it would fail to give a satisfactory account of what
determines a voluntary preference, without resorting to explanations that rely on other
preferences. The cognitive system, on the other hand, does allow the primate to have a certain
degree of control over her actions. The cognitive system evolved mental representations,
declarative memory, mental time-travel and arousal control because, among other reasons, those
abilities give primates the means to delay gratification, given hyperbolic discounting, and to
attain larger later rewards. This, in turn, increases the primate’s fitness.
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Although the intuitive system is completely involuntary, whether or not the cognitive system
is employed involves some sort of voluntary behavior. Some sort of deliberation must go into
deciding what behavioral tactic to deploy, a cost/benefit analysis of the risks and benefits of
deploying the tactic, and how to execute the tactic. This process can be thought of as a precursor
to personal autonomy. But primates’ mental capabilities are not enough to grant them personal
autonomy. This is because primates cannot choose their preferences. The cognitive system only
generates behavioral tactics when a smaller sooner interest would otherwise trump a larger later
interest. Primates’ cognitive systems are slaves to their basic interests. Thus, the effects of
primates’ cognitive systems are determined by their interests, which are involuntarily determined
themselves. A basic requirement of personal autonomy is a being’s ability to endorse (her) own
ends, or to form and act on judgments of what (she) ought to do. 75 Only humans ask whether
desiring a given end is a good reason for taking an action. Primates fail to meet this basic
requirement. In primates, reasoning does not motivate action, interests motivate action. Primates
reasoning ability is limited to the pragmatics of how to attain the object(s) of their desire.
Primates cannot reason about what they ought to do morally; they only reason about how to
satisfy their interests.
Is the deliberative process that primates do engage in sufficient to grant primates the capacity
to reason about the actions they take? I argue that it is. Reasoning about action is generally
thought of as a uniquely human ability that allows its possessor to resolve what course of action
to take through reflection and deliberation.76 But, as I have just indicated, primates do possess an
ability to deliberate about their behavior. Primates are, in a sense, Humean agents where their
reason responsiveness is slave to their basic preferences. They have the ability satiate long term
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interests at the expense of short term interests, that is, they can guide behavior when short term
interests would otherwise be more powerful than long term interests. They engage in
intertemporal rational control.

9. CONCLUSION

I will conclude with a discussion of potentially fruitful areas of future research. Researchers
typically have assumed, explicitly or implicitly, that larger and smaller rewards are discounted at
the same rate, when modeling choice and decision-making in nonhuman animals.77 This may be
an incorrect assumption.78 I have avoided a discussion of magnitude effects (i.e. whether the
relative size of the reward affected the steepness of the discounting) in my analysis of hyperbolic
discounting, mainly because key studies of magnitude effects in hyperbolic discounting in
primates were inconclusive.79 If primates discount smaller amounts of a desired good more
steeply than larger amounts, then it would be of interest to know whether they are more
impulsive when smaller amounts of the good are involved. If they are sufficiently more
impulsive when smaller amounts of a good are involved, that evidence would add a confounder
to the hyperbolic discounting studies I have cited in this thesis. Primates may possess the ability
to exponentially discount future rewards, but they might choose not to when larger later rewards
are relatively small. The primates may not care about smaller amounts of reward, so they might
just grab the smaller sooner reward when the stakes are low. If this is, indeed, the case, then the
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primates may not be hyperbolically discounting at all, which would render my account of the
primate mind dubious. The odds of finding such evidence, however, are relatively low:
magnitude effects in hyperbolic discounting studies using human subjects have been studied, and
experimenters have found that humans do, indeed, discount hyperbolically despite magnitude
effects.80
Furthermore, if magnitude effects do exist in primate discounting behavior, then primates
may possess even more control over their actions and self-awareness than posited by this paper.
Less steep discounting of larger rewards shows a discriminating ability that I have not discussed.
This discounting behavior would show that primates have the ability to enhance the effectiveness
of the cognitive system when high stakes are on the line, that is, when they have more to lose.
This would indicate that they can exert more influence over their actions when it is more
important to their fitness that they do so. This ability might be seen as evidence of a primitive
form of will, or willful behavior.
In this paper, I have investigated the kinds of mental states that primates create when making
decisions that involve delaying gratification. I first presented evidence that primates engage in
hyperbolic discounting, and then created a dialectic between Skinnerian behaviorism and
cognitivism to ascertain which theory best explained the evidence. Since both theories had the
resources to explain hyperbolic discounting, I put forth an Evidential Standard Thesis (EST) in
order to adjudicate which theory best explained the architecture of the primate mind. The EST
was basically that any novel, quickly arising, complex, goal-oriented behavior, not conditioned
in a previous part of the experiment, that primates used to delay gratification, would corroborate
the cognitivist and undermine the behaviorist position. I reviewed the evidence and found that
primates did use unconditioned, novel, quickly arising, complex, goal-oriented behaviors to
80
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delay gratification. I called these behavioral tactics. After adjudicating the debate between the
behaviorist and the Skinnerian, I put forth a theory of the cognitive architecture that allowed the
primates to deploy the behavioral tactics and engage in planning behavior. This theory posited
that a two-part system exists in the primate mind that allows them to make decisions and delay
gratification. The first part is an intuitive system, which possesses the interests of the primate,
ranks them in terms of desirability across time, and uses fast and frugal processing to attain
desired goods. The second part of the two-part system is the cognitive system, which functions
as a stopgap that prevents the smaller sooner interests in the intuitive system from attaining
rewards at the expense of the larger later interests. This system uses declarative memory, spatiotemporal mental representations, mental-time travel and arousal control in order fulfill its
purpose. I further argue that these systems evolved in part as adaptations to fluctuations between
stable and unstable environments, fluctuations that primates had to endure over the course of
their evolutionary history. After establishing this two-part system as a general framework of the
primate mind, I asked some questions and constructed some hypotheses about primate behavior
based on this model. Finally, I talked about the level of control and self-awareness that my model
suggests that primates have over their own mental states. I argue the evidence suggests that they
do have some voluntary control over their behavior, and limited self-awareness, but that they
don’t have the capacity to be motivated by reason: that is, they can’t do something because of the
thought that they ought to do it. Hence, they do not have personal autonomy. What they do have
is inter-temporal voluntary control.
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APPENDIX

Derivation of H.D. curves from decreasing function of probability of reward over time

Upper H.D. curve EU: = ”Objective Value” /(1 +(Discount rate x Delay)) = 10/(1+(0.3(10-t)))
Objective value= 10 bananas
Delay = (10-t) minutes

Discount rate = 0.3

size of reward

time in future

Delay

probability of attaining reward in
future

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

0min
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

10min
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

25%
27%
29.4%
32.26%
35.7%
40%
45.4%
52.6%
62.5%
76%
100%
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Expected Utility

2.5
2.7
2.94
3.226
3.57
4
4.54
5.46
6.25
7.69
10

Lower H.D. curve EU: = ”Objective Value” /(1 +(Discount rate x Delay)) = 5/(1+(0.3(5-t)))

Objective value = 5 bananas
Delay = (5 -t) minutes
Discount rate = 0.3

Size of reward
Or objective value

5
5
5
5
5
5

Time in future

0
1
2
3
4
5

Delay

5
4
3
2
1
0

Probability of
Attaining reward in future
(EU/objective value)
40%
45.4%
52.6%
62.5%
76.92%
100%
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Expected Utility
2
2.27
2.63
3.125
3.85
5

Graph of Upper and Lower Curve EU:

y-axis: EU

x-axis: Delay until reward

x-axis: Delay until reward
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Graph of probability of attaining reward over time for both upper and lower curves:

(in the graph, t =delay until reward)

y-axis:
% chance of
attaining
Reward

x-axis: Delay until reward
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Graph above can be described by F(t)= (1/(1+0.3t))

Each point on this graph represents the chance of getting a reward after a certain delay (t)

To derive the hyperbolic discount curves, simply multiply each y value on graph B

by the objective value of the H.D. curve (to get your y value of the H.D. curve); and then

(objective value-t ) will be your x value on that point on the curve.

for example: at t=5, the y-value is 40%

So for the upper curve, multiply 0.40 x 10, which = 4; 4 is then your y value for that point on
the upper curve and take (10-t)= 5; 5 is then your x value for that point on the upper curve.

To find the corresponding point on the lower curve, multiply 0.40 x 5, which = 2; 2 is then
your y value for the lower curve and take (5-t)= 0; 0 is then your x value for that point on the
lower curve
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Probability Curve 2:
blue is F(t)=(1/(1+3t)), red is F(t)=(1/(1+.9t))

y-axis:
% chance of
Attaining
reward

x-axis: Delay until reward

x-axis: Delay until reward

